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 Introduction 
Twentieth century labour law focused principally on the regulation of the employment 
relationship,1 and assumed ‘the employer’ to be a single (usually corporate) entity 
with considerable freedom to determine the limits of its boundaries, and responsible 
only under the principles of agency and vicarious liability.2  
 
This assumption of a single employer has also underpinned traditional occupational 
health and safety (OHS) regulation. Based on the British Factories Acts which were 
first enacted early in the nineteenth century,3 and in force until the Robens-inspired 
statutes of the late 1970s to early 1990s, Australian OHS legislation primarily 
regulated ‘hardware’ (such as machinery) in factories, and relied on detailed, 
technical specification standards to mandate the safeguards employers and factory 
occupiers were required to provide for employees.4
 
                                                 
1 See, particularly, H Collins, ‘Ascription of Legal Responsibility to Groups in Complex Patterns of 
Economic Integration’ (1990) 53 Modern Law Review 731; H Collins, ‘Independent Contractors and 
the Challenge of Vertical Disintegration to Employment Protection Laws’ (1990) 10 Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 353; L Bennett, Making Labour Law in Australia Industrial Relations, Politics and Law, 
Law Book Company, Sydney, 1994; J Howe and R Mitchell, ‘The Evolution of the Contract of 
Employment in Australia: A Discussion’ (1999) 12 Australian Journal of Labour Law 113; R 
Johnstone, ‘Paradigm Crossed? The Statutory Occupational Health and Safety Obligations of the 
Business Undertaking’’ (1999) 12 Australian Journal of Labour Law 73. 
2 See Collins, ‘Ascription of Legal Responsibility’, above n 1; S Deakin, ‘The Changing Concept of the 
“Employer” in Labour Law’ (2001) 30 Industrial Law Journal 72. 
3 See N Gunningham, Safeguarding the Worker, Law Book Company, Sydney, 2005, chap 2; W B 
Creighton, Working Women and the Law, Mansell, London, 1979, pp 19-26, R Johnstone, 
Occupational Health and Safety Law and Policy: Text and Materials, 2nd ed, LBC Information 
Services, Sydney, 2004, pp 34-45. 
4 See, for example, Factories, Shops and Industries Act 1962 (NSW) and the Construction Safety Act 
1912 (NSW); Labour and Industry Act 1958 (Vic); Factories and Shops Act 1960 (Qld), Inspection of 
Machinery Act 1951 and Factories and Shops Act Rules; Factories and Shops Act 1963 (WA) and 
regulations, Machinery Safety Act 1974 (WA); and Industrial Code Act 1967 (SA) and Industrial Safety 
Code Regulations (SA). 
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From the late 1970s Australian OHS legislation was significantly reformed.5 For 
present purposes, the most important changes were the introduction of general duty 
provisions (the content of which was based largely on the common law negligence 
standard of care),6 including duties on employers and self-employed persons to ensure 
the OHS of employees and persons other than employees; and provisions creating 
criminal offences for corporate officers with particular responsibility for OHS 
offences committed by a corporation. It is now accepted that the general duty 
provisions in the OHS statutes impose strict or absolute duties, which are qualified by 
the notion of ‘reasonably practicable’ or its equivalent.7
 
‘Employers’ in the OHS statutes tend to be defined contractually: as ‘the other party 
to a contract of employment’8 and in some instances other types of contracts focused 
on training. Thus, as Deakin points out, the legal definition of employer is not 
coterminous with the economic or sociological notion of the ‘enterprise’ or 
‘organisation’, nor with the physical site (the workplace) where work is carried out.9 
At the heart of the employer-employee relationship is the right to control the manner 
in which work is carried out.10 Thus an ‘employer’ is defined in the OHS statutes11  
variously as a person who employs another person under a contract of service; 12 as a 
person who ‘conducts a business or undertaking for gain or reward’ and ‘in the 
conduct of the business or undertaking engages another person to do work, other than 
                                                 
5 For details, see Johnstone, above n 3 at pp 63-87. 
6 See E Bluff and R Johnstone, ‘The Relationship Between “Reasonably Practicable” and Risk 
Management Regulation’, National Research Centre for Occupational Health and Safety Regulation 
Working Paper No 27, 2004. 
7 See Johnstone, above n 3 at chap 4; Bluff and Johnstone, above n 6. 
8 Deakin, above n 2, at 73. 
9 Deakin, above n 2, at 73. 
10 See Stevens v Brodribb Sawmilling Co Pty Ltd (1986) 160 CLR 16; and B Creighton and A Stewart, 
Labour Law, 4th ed, Federation Press, Sydney, 2005 at pp 284-288. 
11 See Johnstone, above n 3, at pp 109-110. 
12 See Occupational Health, Safety and Welfare Act 1986 (SA) (OHSWA(SA)) s 4(1), and the 
Occupational Health and Safety Act 1989 (ACT) (OHSA(ACT)) s 5(1). 
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under a contract of services, for or at the direction of the person’;13 as ‘a person who 
employs persons under contracts of employment or apprenticeship’;14 as ‘a person 
who employs one or more other persons under contracts of employment’ or under 
contracts of training;15 or as ‘a person by or for whom a worker is engaged or 
works’16 – thereby including principals engaging independent contractors.  
 
Although the definitions differ, essentially they define an employer as a person who 
employs another person under a contract of employment. In some statutes, contracts 
of apprenticeship or training are included, and in the Northern Territory an employer 
includes principals engaging contractors. In other words, there must be ‘a contractual 
nexus between employer and employee’.17 One consequence of the contractual focus 
is that it ‘can have the effect of completely disembedding the employment 
relationship from the organisational context within which the work is performed’.18 In 
a labour hire arrangement, for example, the services provided by the employee of the 
labour hire agency will be directed at the client or host firm who will generally not 
have a contractual relationship with the employee, but with the agency (although, of 
course, the agency benefits from the employee’s efforts because it will be 
remunerated by the host). 
 
As we noted above, the OHS statutes place duties on self-employed persons who, like 
employers, must ensure the health and safety of persons who are not employees (see 
                                                 
13 Workplace Health and Safety Act 1998 (Qld) (WHSA(Qld)), s 10. 
14 Occupational Health and Safety Act 2000 (NSW) (OHSA(NSW)), s 4; see also Occupational Safety 
and Health Act 1984 (WA) (OSHA(WA)), s 3(1). 
15 Occupational Health and Safety Act 2004 (Vic) (OHSA (Vic)), s 5; see also Workplace Health and 
Safety Act 1995 (Tas) (WHSA(Tas)), s 3(1). 
16 Work Health Act (NT) (WHA (NT)), s 3. 
17 Deakin, above n 2, at 73. 
18 Deakin, above n 2, at 73. 
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below). A ‘self-employed person’ is defined negatively in relation to the contract of 
employment: a ‘self-employed person’ is someone who works for gain or reward 
otherwise than under a contract of employment or apprenticeship, whether or not 
employing others;19 or as a person who (a) conducts a business or undertaking for 
gain or reward; and (b) in the conduct of the business or undertaking is not an 
employer or worker.20 Note that all but two of the statutes refer to the self-employed 
‘person’, suggesting that the self-employed person can be a natural person or 
corporation (see below). The OHSA(NSW) refers to a self-employed person as being 
an ‘individual’ and the OHSA(ACT) as a ‘natural person’, indicating that self-
employed persons in those jurisdictions must be natural persons. 
 
Prima facie these definitions appear to envisage a single entity employer or self-
employed person. This begs the question as to exactly how the general duties in the 
OHS statutes operate when the employer or self-employed person is not a sole 
proprietor or a single corporate entity: for example where various business 
organisations are linked in a contractual chain or network; where operations are run 
by a partnership, unincorporated association or joint venture; where the ostensible 
employer is an entity within in a larger corporate or organisational structure; or in 
situations where the person or entity responsible for engaging or employing workers 
is different to the person or entity with control over assets and decision-making 
concerning OHS. 
 
There has been a world-wide trend, from the 1980s, for corporations, particularly 
large corporations which organised and directed their productive resources within the 
                                                 
19 OHSA(NSW), s 4 and see OHSA(Vic), s 5; OSHA(WA), s 3(1); WHSA(Tas) s 3(1) and OHSA(ACT), 
s 5(1). 
20 WHSA(Qld) s 12. 
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firm using bureaucratic controls, to decompose into ‘separate corporate entities in an 
endeavour to replicate efficient capital markets’.21 The notion of an employer 
responsible for the OHS of its workers has become more challenging with the 
growing complexity of organisational structures themselves. For example, 
corporations may disintegrate, or purchase a majority shareholding in other 
corporations, so that companies form a group in which the holding company and 
subsidiaries have an independent corporate existence within the larger corporate 
group structure.22 There may be over a hundred subsidiaries, and some entities may be 
subsidiaries of a subsidiary. The group is bound together through the holding 
company’s ownership of shares in the subsidiaries.23
 
Second, corporations can outsource tasks and functions to smaller organisations, so 
that:24
As the initiative holders they are positioned at the top of enormous network pyramids of 
supplier contracts. In this position they have the power to contract smaller suppliers. …  
A characteristic “network” structure develops among the large firms which are in a 
position to exert remote control over large groups of smaller suppliers. 
 
A third way in which capital units, or firms, can be linked together within an 
‘economically integrated group’25 occurs when one entity exercises authority over 
other units, even though the controlling unit does not have a majority shareholding, or 
a contractual link, with the controlled units. Such authority can arise from partial 
ownership, where a minority shareholding, while not providing legal control through 
                                                 
21  Collins, ‘Independent Contractors and the Challenge of Vertical Disintegration’, above n 1, at 353. 
22 T Larson, ‘The Diffusion of Employer Responsibility’, in K Frick, P L Jensen, M Quinlan and T 
Wilthagen, Systematic Occupational Health and Safety Management, Pergamon, Amsterdam, 2000. 
23 Collins, ‘Ascription of Legal Responsibility’, above n 1, at 733. 
24 Larson, above n 22, at pp 219-220. 
25 Collins, ‘Ascription of Legal Responsibility’, above n 1, at 733. 
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majority voting power, is nevertheless sufficient to provide the controlling firm with 
managerial control; or may accrue to a creditor, or the holder of a floating charge.26  
 
The key point in all of these situations is that ‘the provider of capital investment 
retains the separate identity from the productive organisation, whilst at the same time 
playing a governing role in the organisation’.27  
 
Each of these developments raise difficult issues for labour regulation, as Collins28 
explains: 
These complex economic organisations bound together by ties of ownership, contract 
and authority may in reality compromise some form of team effort, which could easily 
be integrated within one capital unit, and may therefore be analysed from the point of 
view of institutional economics as quasi firms. Yet since in fact these groups comprise 
distinct legal entities which in law are regarded as independent persons, members of the 
group cannot be held responsible for the acts or omissions of other members without 
contradicting the basic principles of legal responsibility. Thus one company can only be 
liable for its own torts or breach its own contracts, not those of other companies or 
independent contractors with which it has close economic ties. This engenders a serious 
problem for the application of the principle of group responsibility. 
 
In short, the group does not hold obligations to workers, but rather obligations are 
held by each capital unit within the group (a corporation or an individual sole trader), 
and each is civilly and criminally liable for its own acts or omissions (including 
vicarious liability for those of its employees or agents), but not those of the other 
capital units. The firm can manipulate its boundaries (by turning divisions into 
subsidiary companies, or by outsourcing work to another firm) to determine its size, 
and to limit or reduce its legal responsibilities. 
 
                                                 
26 Collins, ‘Ascription of Legal Responsibility’, above n 1, at 733. 
27 Collins, ‘Ascription of Legal Responsibility’, above, n 1 at 734. 
28 Collins, ‘Ascription of Legal Responsibility’, above, n 1 at 734. 
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Where, for example, a holding company owns shares in and controls a number of 
separate but subordinate companies (subsidiaries) within a group, the law regards 
each subsidiary corporation as a separate legal entity, and the ‘group’ has no distinct 
legal personality, and cannot be held to account for contraventions of legal 
obligations. As we discuss below, in contractual chains or organisational networks, 
the large organisation at the peak or centre of arrangements is a legal entity distinct 
from all the other parties in the chain or network, and even though it may exercise 
considerable power over the other parties generally is not legally accountable for 
contraventions of legal obligations by the other parties. 
 
Elsewhere one of us29 has analysed the way in which the general duties imposed upon 
employers and self-employed persons in the reformed OHS statutes operate in relation 
to workers who are not employees (ie contactors and subcontractors and labour hire 
workers). In this article we examine how the OHS statutes operate where ‘the 
employer’ is not a single entity, but: 
• part of a contractual chain or business network;  
• a partnership;  
• an unincorporated association;  
• a joint venture;  
• part of a larger corporate group structure; or  
• is in other ways separate from the person or entity with control over assets and 
decision-making concerning OHS.  
                                                 
29 See Johnstone, n 1; R Johnstone, ‘Regulating Occupational Health and Safety in a Changing Labour 
Market’, (2005) National Research Centre for Occupational Health and Safety Regulation Working 
Paper No 34. See also R Johnstone, C Mayhew and M Quinlan, ‘Outsourcing Risk? The Regulation of 
Occupational Health and Safety Where Subcontractors are Employed’ (2001) 22 Comparative Labor 
Law and Policy Journal 351 and R Johnstone and M Quinlan, ‘The OHS Regulatory Challenges Posed 
by Agency Workers: Evidence from Australia’ (2005) National Research Centre for Occupational 
Health and Safety Regulation Working Paper No 26. 
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 In examining these fundamental legal issues, we highlight examples of situations in 
which duties are owed to a worker by more than one employer (or self-employed 
person). We also explore the extent to which the Australian OHS statutes impose 
liability on the ‘group’ or part of the group, rather than simply on single capital units: 
that is, we consider whether each firm is only responsible for its own contraventions 
of the OHS statutes, or whether it may, in certain circumstances, be responsible for 
the acts or omissions of other firms, such as subsidiaries, independent contractors, or 
franchisees. In considering these issues we show the far-reaching significance of the 
recently enacted ‘corporate officer’ provisions in sections 144 and 145 of the 
OHSA(Vic). 
 
Attributing liability to Individuals, to the Corporate Employer and to Corporate 
Officers 
Before examining the way in which the notions of ‘employer’ and ‘self-employed 
persons’ are operationalised in the context of contractual chains, business networks 
and corporate group structures, we briefly outline the way in which criminal liability 
for contraventions of the obligations in the OHS statutes are attributed to the two 
‘units’ around which these chains, networks and groups are built: individuals and 
corporations. We also remind readers that in any one situation, duties in the OHS 
statutes can be owed by more than one person, and briefly consider the relationship 
between corporate and individual liability in the OHS statutes. 
 
The criminal law developed to hold natural persons accountable for what society 
determines to be crimes. The definitions of ‘employer’ and ‘self-employed person’ 
 10
outlined above refer to ‘persons’, which include natural persons such as individual 
proprietors. The duties and obligations in the OHS statutes clearly apply to employers 
and self-employed persons who are natural persons. 
A general principal of statutory interpretation is, unless rebutted, it is presumed that 
where a statute refers to a ‘person’, this includes a corporation.30 As we saw earlier in 
this paper, all the definitions of the ‘employer’ in the OHS statutes, and all but two of 
the definitions of ‘self-employed person’, are couched in terms of ‘persons’, 
indicating that corporations can be ‘employers’ or ‘self-employed persons’.  
Where the employer or self-employed person is a corporation, the issue arises as to 
how liability can be attributed to the corporation. As noted above, criminal law has 
evolved around the central theme of individual liability,31 which makes the question 
of attributing criminal liability to corporations a complex one. ‘A corporation is an 
abstraction. It has no mind of its own any more than it has a body of its own.’32 
Corporations can only act through their human employees and agents; yet they are 
also legal ‘fictions’ created by company law to be distinct from their directors, 
workers and shareholders.33
Where criminal liability is based on requirements of intention or mens rea, the 
attribution of liability to the corporation is not a straightforward matter. For example, 
for manslaughter by gross negligence to be established, a narrow ‘identification 
doctrine’ has been used to attribute to a ‘corporation’ the requisite criminal fault, 
                                                 
30 Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), s 22; Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW), s 21; Interpretation of 
Legislation Act 1984 (Vic), s 38; Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld), s 36; Acts Interpretation Act 1915 
(SA), s 4; Interpretation Act 1984 (WA), s 5; Acts Interpretation Act 1931 (Tas), s 41; Interpretation 
Act 1967 (ACT), s 14, Interpretation Act (NT) s 19.  
31 C Wells, Corporations and Criminal Responsibility, 2nd ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001, p 
1; A Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law, 4th ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003, p 114. 
32 Lennard’s Carrying Co Ltd v Asiatic Petroleum Co Ltd [1915] AC 705. 
33 See Salomon v Salomon [1897] AC 22. 
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whereby the individual knowledge, intention or actions of particular employees was 
that of the corporation itself.34 Particular officers of the corporation are the 
corporation. The law therefore developed to directly attach criminal liability to the 
corporation through requiring evidence of criminal fault in a senior officer of a 
corporation acting as a ‘directing mind and will’ of that corporation.35
In relation to absolute or strict liability OHS regulatory offences, the courts have held 
that specific duties are owed by the corporation itself, and are personal and non-
delegable.36 Crucially there is no need to try and attribute to the corporation another’s 
criminal conduct. In the words of Tipping J in the New Zealand Court of Appeal:  
This analysis does not depend … upon concepts of agency or vicarious liability. It 
relies simply upon the proposition that once there has been a failure to take a 
practicable step to ensure the employee's safety [hence breaching the duty], the 
employer is responsible for that failure.37
If the employer is a corporation therefore, it will not be absolved from liability for 
breaching an OHS duty simply because at a top management level the organisation 
had taken all reasonable steps to ensure safety, if at an operational level it was the 
court’s opinion that such steps as were ‘reasonably practicable’ had not been taken to 
implement effectively OHS policies and procedures.38
                                                 
34 Wells, above n 31, at p 93; J Gobert and M Punch, Rethinking Corporate Crime, Butterworths, 
London, 2003, pp 59-69; G Slapper and S Tombs, Corporate Crime, Longman, Harlow, 1999, p 28. 
35 Tesco Supermarkets Limited v Nattrass [1972] 2 WLR 1166; H. L. Bolton (Engineering) Co. Ltd. v 
T. J. Graham & Son Ltd  [1957] 1 QB 159, especially at 172; A-G’s Reference (No 2 of 1999) [2000] 
QB 796; R v A C Hattrick Chemicals Pty Ltd, unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria Criminal Division 
(Hampel J) 8 December 1995; Gobert and Punch, above n 34, at pp 59-69. 
36 Linework Limited v Department of Labour [2001] 2 NZLR 639, and the United Kingdom cases, R v 
British Steel Plc [1995] 1 WLR 1356, R v Associated Octel Co Ltd [1996] 4 All ER 846, R v Gateway 
Foodmarkets Ltd [1997] 3 All ER 78. See also WorkCover Authority of New South Wales (Inspector 
Patton) v Fletcher Constructions Australia Ltd (2002) NSWIRComm 316 and W Thompson, 
Understanding the New South Wales Occupational Health and Safety Legislation, 3rd ed, CCH, 
Sydney, 2001, p 27. 
37 Linework Limited v Department of Labour [2001] 2 NZLR 639 at para [45]. 
38 See R v Gateway Foodmarkets Ltd [1997] 3 All ER 78. See also R v Associated Octel Co Ltd [1996] 
4 All ER 846. 
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There may be considerable overlap in the operation of the general duties in the OHS 
statutes:39 unless the statute provides otherwise, more than one general duty might be 
owed in any one situation, and more than one person can owe the same general duty. 
Thus, the OHS statutes envisage the possibility that, in any one situation, a worker 
might be owed duties by a number of employers and/or self-employed persons.40
 
If the corporate ‘employer’ commits an OHS offence, can individual directors or 
managers be held criminally culpable as well? Of course, managers are ‘employees’, 
and can contravene the duties in the OHS statutes imposed upon ‘employees’ in 
relation to their own health and safety and the health and safety of others. Further, 
most of the Australian OHS statutes make provision for individual directors, 
managers or officers of a corporation to be prosecuted in certain circumstances for 
offences committed by the corporation. For example, section 26 of the 
OHSA(NSW)41 provides that: 
 
(1) If a corporation contravenes, whether by act or omission, any provision of this Act or 
the regulations, each individual director of the corporation, and each person 
concerned in the  management of the corporation, is taken to have contravened the 
same provision unless the director or manager satisfies the court that: 
(a) he or she was not in a position to influence the conduct of the corporation in 
relation to its contravention of the provision; or 
(b) he or she, being in such a position, used all due diligence to prevent the 
contravention by the corporation. 
 
A second approach to corporate officer liability is found in section 55(1) of the 
OSHA(WA)42 which provides that 
Where a body corporate is guilty of an offence under this Act and it is proved 
that the offence occurred with the consent or connivance of, or was attributable 
                                                 
39 See Johnstone, above n 3, at p 301. 
40 But see C Maxwell, Occupational Health and Safety Act Review, State of Victoria, Melbourne, 2004, 
chap 11. 
41 See also WHSA(Qld), s 167. 
42 See also WHA(NT), s 180. 
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to any neglect on the part of, any director, manager, secretary or other officer of 
the body, or any person who was purporting to act in any such capacity he, as 
well as the body corporate, is guilty of that offence. 
  
The recently enacted OHSA(Vic) provides a third model of liability. It is a particularly 
important provision in the context of this paper because it recasts the duties placed on 
corporate officers in a way that pushes responsibility for OHS up the corporate 
structure. The OHSA(Vic) picks up the definition of ‘officer’ in the Corporations Act, 
as including ‘a person   
(i) who makes, or participates in making, decisions that affect the whole, or a 
substantial part, of the business of the corporation; or 
(ii) who has the capacity to affect significantly the corporation’s financial 
standing; or 
(iii) in accordance with whose instructions or wishes directors of the corporation 
are accustomed to act …’43
 
Section 144 imposes liability on a corporate ‘officer’ where a body corporate 
contravenes the Act and ‘the contravention is attributable to an officer of the body 
corporate failing to take reasonable care’ to prevent the organisation from 
contravening the Act. By virtue of section 145, this model of liability extends to 
‘officers’ of partnerships and unincorporated associations, because the ‘Act is not 
concerned with the particular legal form through which the undertaking is 
conducted’.44 We will now consider those organisational structures in the context of 
the reach of OHS legislation, before considering joint ventures, contractual chains and 
networks, and then returning to the corporation itself in terms of liability of 
corporations within corporate group structures. Of significance in relation to the 
OHSA(Vic) definition of ‘officer’ is the fact that a corporation within such a group 
might be held liable as an ‘officer’ of another corporation within the group. 
                                                 
43 OHSA(Vic), s 5, adopting the definition of ‘officer’ contained in the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 
9. 
44 Maxwell, above n 40, at p 173. 
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 Before we explore the way in which these Victorian corporate officer provisions 
affect partnership, unincorporated association and corporate group liability, we build 
on previous work45 to show how some of the issues of group liability are addressed by 
provisions in the OHS statutes which impose duties on employers and self-employed 
persons in relation to persons who are not employees. 
 
Contractual Chains and Networks 
Many industries, particularly construction, road transport46 and parts of 
manufacturing, have a high incidence of the use of contractual chains or networks. 
For example, the production of clothing often takes place via a long contractual chain, 
at the top of which are the major retailers, which enter into arrangements with 
principal manufacturers, which in turn give out orders for the production of clothing 
goods to  small factory sweatshops, which then engage home-based outworkers.47 
Motor car manufacturers typically purchase parts from independent suppliers, and 
once the car is assembled it is sold via distributorships or franchises by independent 
companies. Organisations at the top end of contractual chains, or at the centre of these 
networks, can exercise significant power and control over the operations, and working 
conditions, of others party to the arrangements. As Collins48 points out:  
the management of a large firm substitutes commercial contracts for employment 
relations.  … Despite the form of contractual relation …, however, in substance the 
workers frequently appear to be in an equivalent position of social subordination and 
economic dependence to that of ordinary employees, and so in need of those 
employment protection rights from which they are often excluded by virtue of having 
ceased to qualify as employees. 
                                                 
45 See Johnstone, above n 1 and Johnstone, above n 29. 
46 See M Quinlan, ‘Report of Inquiry into Safety in the Long-Haul Trucking Industry’, Motor 
Accidents Authority of New South Wales, Sydney, 2001. 
47 See I Nossar, R Johnstone and M Quinlan, ‘Regulating Supply-Chains to Address the Occupational 
Health and Safety Problems Associated With Precarious Employment: The Case of Home-Based 
Clothing Workers in Australia’, (2004) 17 Australian Journal of Labour Law, 1. 
48 Collins, ‘Independent Contractors and the Challenge of Vertical Disintegration’, above n 1 at 354. 
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 The OHS statutes contain provisions which might ensure that each ‘employer’ or 
‘self-employed person’ in a contractual chain or an organisational network owe 
general duties to ensure the health and safety of other firms (themselves ‘self-
employed persons’ or ‘employers’) in the contractual chain or organisational network. 
The application of these provisions develops the two other themes in this paper: it 
demonstrates that these provisions impose some degree of ‘group liability’, 
principally through the wide reach of the duties (including through various ‘deeming’ 
provisions) and their non-delegability; and it provides examples of situations in which 
a worker can concurrently be owed duties by two – sometimes more – ‘employers’, or 
by a series of ‘employers’ and ‘self-employed persons’. 
 
First, all of the Australian OHS statutes impose a duty upon the ‘employer’ in broad 
terms to provide and maintain, so far as is reasonably practicable, for employees a 
working environment that is safe and without risks to health.49 The duties have, 
however, been broadly interpreted so as to have a reach outside the employment 
relationship and to affect, inter alia, independent businesses engaged by the employer: 
in safeguarding the OHS of its employees, the employer will have to ensure that all 
workers, including contractors, sub-contractors, sub-contractors and their employees 
are, as far as is reasonably practicable, instructed, trained and supervised so that their 
work practices do not threaten the health and safety of the employer’s employees.50    
 
                                                 
49 See, for example, OHSA(Vic), s 21 and OHSA(NSW), s 8(1) and s 28. 
50 See, for example, R v Swan Hunter Shipbuilders [1982] 1 All ER 264; and see also WorkCover 
Authority of NSW v Crown in the Right of the State of NSW (Police Service of New South Wales) (No 2) 
(2001) 104 IR 268 at para [24]. 
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Occasionally the OHS statutes impose the employer’s general duty to employees on 
two different employers in relation to the same employee. For example, under the 
OHSWA(SA) an ‘employee’ of a labour hire agency is owed the employer’s duty of 
care to employees by both the agency and the host firm, because section 19(1) 
couches the employer’s duty to apply ‘in respect of each employee employed or 
engaged by the employer’. In Moore v Fielders Steel Roofing Pty Ltd51 the South 
Australian Industrial Court interpreted the expression ‘engaged’ very broadly to mean 
‘provide  occupation (for a person)’ so that a person employed under a contract of 
employment by a third party (in this case an ‘employee’ of a labour hire agency) and 
who works for ‘the employer’ pursuant to an agreement between the employer and 
labour hire agency is owed a duty because the ‘employer’ ‘engages’ the labour hire 
‘employee’ even though there is no contract between them.  
 
Second, most of the reformed OHS statutes include provisions which deem certain 
kinds of workers to be ‘employees’ protected by the employer’s general duty to 
‘employees’. The most extensive ‘deeming’ provision is to be found in the Western 
Australian OSHA(WA), which ‘deems’ contractors and ‘any person employed or 
engaged by the contractor’ to assist in carrying out work to be ‘employees’ of the 
principal for the purposes of the employer’s general duty in relation to matters over 
which the principal has the capacity to exercise control.52 Similar provisions deem 
labour hire workers, whether employees or independent contractors of the labour hire 
agency, to be ‘employees’ of both the agency and host firm (even though there may 
not be a contract with the latter), in relation to matters over which they respectively 
                                                 
51 Moore v Fielders Steel Roofing Pty Ltd [2003] SAIRC 75. 
52 OSHA(WA), s 23D. 
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have the capacity to exercise control53 and ‘labour arrangements in general’ in which 
a worker carries out work for another person even in the absence of a contract.54  
 
None of the other OHS statutes contain such wide ranging deeming provisions, 
although most deem contractors and their employees to be ‘employees’ of the 
employer who engages them for the purposes of the operation of the employer’s 
general duty. For example, the OHSA(Vic) deems, for the purposes of the employer’s 
duty to employees, independent contractors engaged by the employer, and the 
employees of the independent contractor, to be ‘employees’ of the ‘employer’ in 
matters over which the employer (i) has control, or (ii) would have control but for any 
agreement between the employer and the independent contractor to the contrary.55 
These deeming provisions have generally been broadly interpreted by the courts: for 
example, in relation to section 21(3) of the OHSA(Vic), in The Queen v ACR Roofing 
Pty Ltd56 the Victorian Court of Appeal interpreted the term ‘engaged’ very broadly to 
include any independent contractor in relation to matters over which the employer has 
control even if the contractor was not in a direct contractual relationship with the 
employer, but instead was engaged as a sub-contractor, or even further down the 
contractual chain.57  In other words, each contractor or sub-contractor in the 
contractual chain will owe duties to all contractors or sub-contractors, and their 
employees, below them in the contractual chain. 
                                                 
53 OSHA(WA), s 23E. 
54 OSHA(WA), s 23F. 
55 OHSA(Vic), s 21(3); see also Occupational Health and Safety (Commonwealth Employment) Act 
1991 (Cth) (OHS(CE)A(Cth)), s 16(4); OHSWA(SA), s 4(2); WHA(NT), s 3(1); and Johnstone, above n 
3 at pp 187-188. 
56 The Queen v ACR Roofing Pty Ltd [2004] VSCA 215. 
57 See particularly Nettle J at para 54. See also Stratton v Van Driel Limited (1998) 87 IR 151, 
discussed in Johnstone, above n 3 at pp 188-9; Complete Scaffold v Adelaide Brighton Cement & Anor 
[2001] SASC 1999; Moore v Adelaide Brighton Cement [2003] SAIRC 69; Fielders v Adelaide 
Brighton Cement Ltd [2003] SAIRC 69; and Fielders Steel Roofing Pty Ltd v Moore [2004] SAIRC 62: 
but cf Stevenson v The Broken Hill Proprietary Company Company Limited [1995] SAIRC 2. 
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 These deeming provisions in many cases result in an ‘employee’ being owed duties of 
care by two ‘employers’: for example, by the labour hire agency and host firm in 
Western Australia, or by the employer engaging a contractor and by the contractor 
which employs the employee in Victoria, the Commonwealth, South Australia, 
Western Australia and the Northern Territory. In the light of the decision in the ACR 
Roofing case, a worker may be owed duties by more than two ‘employers’. 
 
Third, the most significant provisions affecting business networks and contractual 
chains are the employer and self-employed person’s duties to persons other than 
employees. Here the most far-reaching provisions are to be found in the OHSA(Vic) 
sections 23 and 24 and the WHSA(Qld) section 28. In essence these provisions 
provide that employers and self employed persons in Victoria, and persons conducting 
a business or undertaking in Queensland, must ensure persons who are not employees 
‘are not exposed’ to risks to OHS arising from ‘the conduct of the undertaking’. Once 
again, the courts have taken a broad approach to interpreting the key expressions 
‘exposed to risk’58  and ‘conduct of the undertaking’.59  
 
The courts’ acceptance that the duty is a personal and non-delegable duty, means a 
firm cannot delegate its duty by engaging an independent contractor to perform the 
work: the firm will be liable for contraventions of the OHS statutes resulting for the 
activities of the independent contractors. The principal of non-delegability enables 
responsibility for OHS to be sheeted home to the firms higher in the contractual chain, 
                                                 
58 See R v Board of Trustees of the Science Museum [1993] 1 WLR 1171. 
59 Whittaker v Delmina Pty Ltd  (1998) 87 IR 268 at 280-281; WorkCover Authority of New South 
Wales (Inspector Martin) v Edmund Hubert Kuipers and Civil Services Pty Ltd [2004] NSWIRComm 
303 at para [55]; R v Associated Octel Co Ltd [1996] 4 All ER 846 at 851-852; R v Mara [1987] 1 
WLR 87; and Sterling-Winthrop Group Limited v Allen (1987) SCCR 25. 
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rather than those firms being responsible only for the acts or omissions of their own 
employees or agents.60 Thus the firm can determine for itself what sorts of contractual 
arrangements it wants to enter to ensure that its undertaking is carried out, but it 
cannot delegate its obligations to comply with the OHS statute. The employer or self-
employed person is under a duty to exercise control over the activity, and to ensure 
that it is done without exposing employees and non-employees to risk.61 In sum, these 
provisions impose a hierarchy of overlapping and complementary responsibilities on 
the different levels of contractors and sub-contractors. For example, employers, 
contractors and subcontractors at each level owe duties to all parties below them in 
the contractual chain. As with some of the deeming provisions discussed above, in a 
long contractual chain this might mean that a sub-sub-contractor and its employees 
might be owed duties by two or more ‘employers’ or ‘self-employed persons’ higher 
in the contractual chain. 
 
Sections 8(2) and 9(1) of the OHSA(NSW) are similar to the Victorian and 
Queensland provisions, but specify that the duty only applies to non-employees while 
they are at the employer’s or self-employed person’s place of work. The provisions in 
the OHSA(ACT) and in the OHS(CE)A(Cth) are similar to the New South Wales 
provisions, but the qualification extends to areas at or near the workplace. Although 
the expressions ‘place of work’ or ‘workplace’ have been very generously interpreted 
by the courts,62 these geographical limitations (namely that the person protected by 
the duty must be at or near the duty holder’s workplace) are significant, and may 
                                                 
60 See further Collins, ‘Ascription of Legal Responsibility’, above n 1 at 735. 
61 R v Associated Octel Co Ltd [1996] 4 All ER 846.  
62 See especially  WorkCover Authority of New South Wales (Inspector Keenan) v Technical and 
Further Education Commission (1999) 92 IR 251 especially at 292; WorkCover Authority of New 
South Wales (Inspector Campbell) v Hitchcock (2004) 135 IR 377 especially at para [314]; and 
WorkCover Authority of New South Wales (Inspector Wilson) v Chubb Security Australia Pty Limited 
[2005] NSWIRComm 263. 
 20
prevent the duties from extending to firms which do not carry out their work at (or 
near) the duty-holder’s workplace: for example, home-based sub-contractors and 
contractor truck drivers affected by consignment conditions, each of which will be 
working at their own workplaces, and not the workplace of the employer or self-
employed person. 
 
The other OHS statutes do not build the duty to others around concepts of exposure to 
risk from the conduct of the undertaking. The broadest of these other provisions is the 
OSHA(WA) which provides, in section 21, that an employer or a self-employed 
person must, as far as is reasonably practicable, ensure that the safety or health of a 
non-employee is not ‘adversely affected wholly or in part as a result of’ (a) work 
undertaken by an employer, employee of the employer or a self-employed person or 
(b) any hazard that arises from or is increased by such work, or by a system of work 
operated by the employer or self-employed person. This latter focus on systems of 
work appears not to require the hazard to be based at the employer or self-employed 
person’s workplace, and probably covers firms and their employees below them in the 
contractual chain. 
Section 22(2) of the OHSWA(SA) provides that an employer or self-employed person  
must ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, that any other person (not being an 
employee employed or engaged by the employer or the self-employed person) is 
safe from injury and risks to health— (a) while the other person is at a workplace 
that is under the management and control of the employer or self-employed person; 
or (b) while the other person is in a situation where he or she could be adversely 
affected through an act or omission occurring in connection with the work of the 
employer or self-employed person.  
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Paragraph (a) appears to impose the same geographical restrictions to the application of 
the duty which limit the reach of the corresponding provisions in the OHSA(NSW) (see 
above), but paragraph (b) appears only to require a causal connection between the person 
and the source of risk, and would appear to extend an employer or self-employed persons 
responsibilities to other firms and workers lower in the contractual chain. 
 
Sections 29(1) and 30A(b) of the WHA(NT) require an employer and self-employed 
person, so far as is reasonably practicable, to ensure that the OHS of any other person 
is not adversely affected as a result of the work in which the employer or self-
employed person is engaged. Although not as far-reaching provision as the Victorian 
and Queensland duties, this would appear to have a relatively broad application, and 
arguably could cover firms and their employees further down the contractual chain. 
 
The Tasmanian duty to persons other than employees appears to be the narrowest in 
scope and reach. The WHSA(Tas) requires an employer to ensure, so far as is 
practicable, the OHS of persons who are not employees, contractors or employees of 
contractors, ‘is not adversely affected as a result of work carried on at the 
workplace’.63 A self-employed person has a duty to ensure, so far as is practicable, 
that others ‘are not exposed to risks’ to their OHS arising from work carried out at the 
self-employed person’s workplace. Like the New South Wales provision, these 
provisions are limited geographically in application to the workplace. 
 
Example: Franchise Arrangements 
A franchise is a contractual arrangement under which the franchisor, who owns a 
brand name, grants the franchisee the right to sell or produce the brand name product. 
                                                 
63 WHSA(Tas), s 9(3). 
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Under a business format franchise the franchisor grants the franchisee a license to use 
an established business system as an ongoing business run by the franchisee in return 
for a licensing fee. Clearly franchisees would owe their employees, contractors and 
members of the public under their general duties, as employers, to employees and 
persons other than employees.  
 
It would appear that the provisions outlined above in sections 23 and 24 of the 
OHSA(Vic) and section 28 of the WHSA(Qld) would apply to franchisors, as it is 
difficult to see how a franchisor in Queensland or Victoria could argue that 
contractual arrangements with a franchisee in which the franchisor licenses its 
business system for use by the franchisee is not part of the way in which the 
franchisor conducts its undertaking. Therefore a franchisor most likely owes a duty to 
a franchisee and, importantly for this paper, the employees and contractors of the 
franchisee to ensure, as far as is practicable, that the system of work to be carried out 
by franchisees is safe and without risks to health. In short, these provisions in the 
OHSA(Vic) and WHSA(Qld) have a very broad reach, and ensure that a firm’s OHS 
responsibilities extend to other firms and their employees who are engaged by the 
franchisee in the conduct of the franchisor’s undertaking.  
 
This reach is probably not achieved in the OHSA(NSW) where the duty is only owed 
to parties at the employer or self-employed person’s workplace.64 Neither is it 
achieved in jurisdictions which rely on provisions which ‘deem’ contractors and their 
employees (but not their sub-contractors) to be employees. On the other hand, the 
                                                 
64  Although there may be circumstances in which it might be possible to argue that the franchisor has 
such control over the workplace the subject of the franchise arrangements that the workplace is the 
franchisor’s workplace: see WorkCover Authority of New South Wales (Inspector Wilson) v Chubb 
Security Australia Pty Limited [2005] NSWIRComm 263. 
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OHSA(NSW) has a broadly framed duty imposed on persons in control of premises, 
which has been interpreted to cover certain kinds of franchise arrangements. Section 
10(1) provides that ‘a person who has control of premises used by people as a place of 
work must ensure that the premises are safe and without risks to health.’ Section 10(2) 
requires a ‘person who has control of any plant or substance used by people at work’ 
to ‘ensure that the plant or substance is safe and without risks to health when properly 
used’.65 Franchisors who exercise control over the franchisee’s operations owe duties 
to employees of franchisees, and franchisors, or persons associated with franchisors, 
who design, build or lease premises for use at work must properly consider safety 
aspects of those premises.66 The duties imposed upon persons on control of premises 
are not as broadly expressed in other Australian jurisdictions, but some of these 
provisions may, in certain circumstances apply to franchise arrangements.67
 
Later in this article we show that responsibility for OHS duties can be sheeted home 
to franchisors under the officer provisions in the OHSA(Vic). But first we explore the 
impact of those officer provisions on other organisational forms, including 
partnerships, unincorporated associations, joint ventures and corporate groups. 
 
Partnerships 
Where a business conducted as a partnership is engaging or employing workers, it is 
unlikely that difficulties would arise in relation to imposing duties upon all partners. 
A partnership is not a structure that other individuals or entities (being the ‘true 
employers’ and decision makers in relation to OHS) can hide behind, for example to 
                                                 
65 See further OHSA(NSW), ss 10(3) and (4). 
66 See, for example, WorkCover Authority of New South Wales v McDonald’s Australia Limited and 
Another (1999) 95 IR 383. 
67 See in particular, OSHA(WA), s 22(a) and WHSA(Tas), s 15(3). 
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avoid liability for non-compliance with OHS legislation. This is because the State 
Partnership Acts render partners jointly liable for all debts and obligations of the 
firm,68 make partners liable for one another’s acts and omissions,69  and deem partners 
to be agents for the firm and one another, binding one another by their acts.70 Indeed, 
in most jurisdictions when a partnership fails to comply with its OHS obligations, 
each partner is prosecuted for contravening the relevant general duty or provision in 
the OHS regulations. 
 
To avoid any doubt, the OHSA(Vic) includes as part of its definition of ‘officer’ taken 
from the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) as described above, ‘a partner in a 
partnership’.71 Further, and as we noted above, under section 145 an officer of a 
partnership is guilty of an offence if the commission of the offence is attributable to 
an officer failing to take reasonable care. 
 
Partners may seek to avoid liability by one of the partners forming a subsidiary 
company to act as employer in relation to the undertaking of the partnership. This is 
illustrated by the recent decision in Inspector Alwyn Piggott v CSR Emoleum Services 
Pty Ltd72 where, for whatever reason, it suited the prosecution to pursue the subsidiary 
company as employer, rather than bring a prosecution against the partners in the 
partnership. In that case it was the defendant subsidiary company which argued 
unsuccessfully that the partnership itself should have been liable as employer for 
                                                 
68 See for example Partnership Act 1891 (Qld), s 12; Partnership Act 1892 (NSW), s 9 and Partnership 
Act 1958 (Vic), s 13. See also S Deakin and G Morris, Labour Law, 4 ed, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 
2005, p 209. 
69 See for example Partnership Act 1891 (Qld), s 13; Partnership Act 1892 (NSW), s 10 and 
Partnership Act 1958 (Vic), s 14. 
70 See for example Partnership Act 1891 (Qld), s 8; Partnership Act 1892 (NSW), s 5 and Partnership 
Act 1958 (Vic), s 9. 
71 See also Maxwell, above n 40, at p 173. 
72 Inspector Alwyn Piggott v CSR Emoleum Services Pty Ltd  [2003] NSWIRComm 282. 
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breaches of the Occupational Health and Safety Act 1983 (NSW). The ways in which 
such a decision might be used to prevent partners from facing liability will be 
discussed below in relation to corporate group structures. Aside from the use of a 
corporate group structure to avoid liability in this way, however, a business conducted 
as a partnership should not pose difficulties in relation to OHS compliance. The 
position is not as straightforward in relation to unincorporated associations, joint 
ventures and corporate groups in relation to the duties imposed on employers under 
OHS legislation. These are groups wherein difficulties might arise in determining who 
the ‘employer’ is, or in imposing the duty of care on those with the ability to influence 
an employer’s OHS compliance. 
 
Unincorporated Associations 
Where an unincorporated association (such as a sporting club) employs or engages a 
worker, there are difficulties in determining who the ‘employer’ is, given that the 
association itself has no separate legal status. Courts have held that it is the committee 
members who will be deemed to have entered into contracts with employees,73 and 
who would therefore be the ‘employer’ for the purpose of OHS legislation. Problems 
arise when committee membership changes between the date of appointment of the 
employee and the date, for example, of an OHS contravention. It may be difficult to 
characterise any set of committee members as the ‘employer’: firstly, on the basis that 
the committee members at the time of employing or engaging a worker cannot have 
intended to be legally bound once they were no longer committee members; and 
secondly, on the basis that successive committees cannot be said to have entered into 
the contract at all. The result is that there is no enforceable employment contract and 
                                                 
73 See Bradley Egg Farm Ltd v Clifford [1943] 2 All ER 378; and Peckham v Moore [1975] 1 NSWLR 
353. 
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presumably no contractual employment relationship.74 The courts may deal with this 
by characterising the worker as making a fresh offer to work to each successive 
committee, each of which is deemed to accept that offer when placing the worker on 
the pay roll.75 It would, however be prudent to rely on the common law, with its 
inherent uncertainties, in dealing with unincorporated associations for the purpose of 
OHS. This can be demonstrated by the unsatisfactory nature of the decision in 
Peckham v Moore.76 Peckham, a football player, sought to recover workers’ 
compensation from his club for an injury sustained during training, and sued as his 
employers, the committee members at the time of his employment. Those committee 
members successfully appealed against a judgment that had been entered against them 
in the lower court on the basis that Peckham had sued the wrong committee members. 
The New South Wales Court of Appeal construed the employment contract as having 
been adopted by the current committee members as employers, and held that the 
committee members at the time of entry into the employment contract were no longer 
in an employment relationship with Peckham. 
 
It is easy to imagine situations where a prosecution for contravention of an OHS 
statutory duty against committee members at the time a worker was employed might 
fail on the basis of no continuing contractual relationship between that worker and 
those committee members. Considerable resources might be wasted on pursuing the 
wrong defendants or ascertaining who the appropriate defendants are. The 
OHSA(Vic), by adopting the definition of ‘officer’ outlined above, effectively 
removes uncertainty because that definition includes ‘an office holder of the 
                                                 
74 Carlton Cricket and Football Social Club v Joseph [1970] VR 487. 
75 As was held in Peckham v Moore [1975] 1 NSWLR 353. 
76 Peckham v Moore [1975] 1 NSWLR 353. 
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unincorporated association if the entity is an unincorporated association’.77 Under 
section 145, an officer of an unincorporated association is guilty of an offence if the 
commission of the offence is attributable to the officer failing to take reasonable care. 
There is no need to establish that particular committee members can be construed as 
‘employers’ under an employment contract. 
 
Joint Ventures 
In a joint venture arrangement it may be unclear exactly who owes the ‘employer’s’ 
or self employed person’s general duty of care under the OHS statutes (see above), or 
it may not be easy to impose liability on one joint venturer who may have assets and 
decision-making power in relation to OHS, but who may not officially be ‘the 
employer’ in the sense of not being the one to engage or employ the workers. 
Whereas all partners in a partnership will be liable for one another’s acts and 
omissions as discussed above, the same does not apply to a joint venture. The usual 
distinction between a joint venture and a partnership is that two or more persons are 
engaged in a single venture under a joint venture, as opposed to a continuing business 
under a partnership. Even then, however, the relationship may be regarded as a 
partnership at law, for example pursuant to section 32(b) of the Partnership Act 1892 
(NSW) which provides for a partnership ‘entered into for a single adventure or 
undertaking’. In Canny Gabriel Castle Jackson Advertising Pty Ltd and Fourth Media 
Management Pty Ltd v Volume Sales (Finance) Pty Ltd78, the parties referred to their 
arrangement as a joint venture. It was held, however, to be a partnership because the 
parties had entered into an enterprise with a view to sharing profit, under which they 
had had to jointly agree on the policy of the business venture, and under which they 
                                                 
77 See Maxwell, above n 40, at pp 174-175. 
78 Canny Gabriel Castle Jackson Advertising Pty Ltd and Fourth Media Management Pty Ltd v Volume 
Sales (Finance) Pty Ltd  (1974) 131 CLR 321; 3 ALR 409. 
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were affected by and concerned with one another’s financial stability. To avoid a 
finding that an arrangement is a partnership, the joint venture arrangement will need 
to involve sharing product not profit, and co-ownership not joint ownership of assets.  
 
Where a business structure is regarded at law as being a joint venture, it will often be 
clear which of the joint venture partners is responsible for the joint venture project in 
terms of employing workers and managing day-to-day operations. There will 
therefore be little doubt as to which joint venturer is the appropriate defendant to an 
OHS prosecution.79 Consider, however, the position where one joint venturer might 
be responsible for employing workers, whilst another controls assets to an extent 
which might impact upon OHS compliance.  It may be difficult to impose the duty of 
care under the OHS statutes on a party to the venture which does not officially engage 
or employ workers. By adopting its current definition of ‘officer’, the OHSA(Vic) 
attempts to overcome such difficulties. This is because that definition of officer, in 
relation to entities that are neither corporations nor individuals, includes a person 
‘who makes, or participates in making, decisions that affect the whole, or a substantial 
part, of the business of the entity; or who has the capacity to affect significantly the 
entity’s financial standing.’ An ‘officer’ of a joint venture would be liable for an 
offence under the OHSA(Vic) as an ‘officer of an unincorporated body or association’ 
under section 145. 
 
Corporate Groups 
                                                 
79 See for example the decision in Morrison v North Mining Limited [2003] NSWIRComm 84, where 
there were 3 companies engaged in a joint venture, however the company sued for breaches of OHS 
held an 80% share in the joint venture, managed the project and was responsible for day to day 
operations. 
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Of particular interest is the possibility that companies within a group structure might 
avoid the imposition of a statutory duty of care with respect to OHS. The avoidance of 
various types of legal liabilities by the use of corporate group structures has been well 
recognised in corporate law and has been the impetus for calls for corporate law 
reform.80  
…more or less complex group structures may be used to avoid the impact of regulatory 
measures on a wide range of matters, such as monopolies and mergers legislation, 
health and safety provisions, employee participation and planning requirements.81
 
The High Court has defined a ‘corporate group’ as follows:- 
The word “group” is generally applied to a number of companies which are associated 
by common or interlocking shareholdings, allied to unified control or capacity to 
control.82
 
The first part of this paper has outlined in some detail problems which corporate 
group structures might present for labour regulation, particularly where there has been 
a separation of capital assets from employer obligations. One recognised reason for 
adopting a corporate group structure is that it makes it possible for a ‘holding 
company’, that is, a company which effectively controls another company, ‘the 
subsidiary’, either through shareholdings or control of the subsidiary’s board,83 to 
avoid liabilities incurred by a subsidiary, by virtue of the principle of limited 
liability.84 Examples of avoidance of liability in relation to industrial relations 
                                                 
80 See for example Companies and Securities Advisory Committee, Corporate Groups Final Report, 
May 2000; and Report of the Special Commission of Inquiry into the Medical Research and 
Compensation Foundation, September 2004, available at http://www.cabinet.nsw.gov.au/hardie/ Part 
A.pdf viewed 06/07/05. 
81 T Hadden, ‘The regulation of Corporate Groups in Australia’, (1992) 15 University of NSW Law 
Journal 61. 
82 Walker v Wimborne (1976) 2 ACLR 529 at 532. 
83 See the definition of ‘subsidiary’ in Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 46.  
84 See also Deakin and Morris, above n 68, at pp 209-210. 
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liabilities and tortious liabilities can be found in the Patrick Stevedores cases85 and in 
Briggs v James Hardie & Co Pty Ltd86 respectively. The Patrick Stevedores cases 
concerned the restructure of that group so that there was a division in the group 
between the company which held assets, and those companies in the group which 
employed workers. This effectively enabled the company with assets to terminate 
labour supply contracts with the employer companies following industrial action, 
causing the employer companies to be placed into administration and the workers to 
be dismissed. Briggs v James Hardie concerned the liability of James Hardie & Co 
Pty Ltd for negligence when an Indigenous man contracted asbestosis whilst 
employed by a subsidiary of James Hardie & Co Pty Ltd - Asbestos Pty Ltd. It 
became apparent that James Hardie & Co Pty Ltd could only face liability if the 
‘corporate veil’ could be lifted, a concept which will be discussed below. More 
recently, the Special Commission of Inquiry into the Medical Research and 
Compensation Foundation investigated the restructure of the James Hardie group of 
companies to avoid liabilities in negligence to victims of asbestosis. This restructure 
involved moving those companies within the group with assets off shore, and severing 
those companies from the asbestos liabilities, leaving a Medical Research and 
Compensation Foundation in Australia with limited funds with which to meet 
asbestos liabilities. This provides a clear illustration of the way in which corporate 
structures might be used to avoid liabilities, including responsibility for 
contraventions of OHS statutes. 
 
                                                 
85 Maritime Union of Australia v Patrick Stevedores No 1 Pty Ltd (1998) 27 ACSR 497; Patrick 
Stevedores Operation No 2 Pty Ltd v Maritime Union of Australia (1998) 27 ACSR 521; (1998) 27 
ACSR 535.  
86 Briggs v James Hardie & Co Pty Ltd (1989) 7 ACLC 841. 
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The decision in Inspector Alwyn Piggott v CSR Emoleum Services Pty Ltd87, whilst on 
one level an example of a successful prosecution of a defendant employer, also 
demonstrates the way in which a holding company might avoid liability in relation to 
OHS contraventions, by forming a subsidiary company to act as ‘employer’. In that 
case, two companies, CSR Ltd and Vacuum Oil Co Pty Ltd, had formed a 
‘bituminous road surfacing partnership’ trading under the registered business name 
CSR Emoleum Road Services (‘CSRERS’). A company, which was a wholly owned 
subsidiary of CSR Ltd, was formed to carry out the work of the partnership and to 
employ workers. That company was the defendant in these proceedings, CSR 
Emoleum Services Pty Ltd (‘CSRES’). The partnership trading as CSRERS entered 
into a contract with JCS Engineering to upgrade a batching plant, and a labour hire 
firm, Advantage Personnel, provided the labour to JCS Engineering to enable it to 
undertake that work. One of the workers supplied by Advantage was fatally injured in 
the course of the work, and it was found on the facts that this was due to a 
contravention of OHS requirements by the project manager, Kevin Johnson, an 
employee of the defendant subsidiary company, CSRES. CSRES argued that it was 
the partnership, not CSRES, which had the agreement with JCS for the work to be 
done and which selected the defendant’s employees, and that it was the partnership, 
not the defendant subsidiary company, which was conducting the undertaking. This 
argument failed, the Court seeking to give effect to the contractual arrangements in 
place, under which the defendant was formed to carry out the work of the partnership 
and employ workers for that purpose. As stated, this enabled the prosecution to 
proceed successfully against the defendant subsidiary company. Consider, however, a 
situation where it is sought to make a holding company liable for OHS breaches, and 
                                                 
87 Inspector Alwyn Piggott v CSR Emoleum Services Pty Ltd [2003] NSWIRComm 282. 
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where such a prosecution fails because that company is able to point to contractual 
arrangements whereby a subsidiary had been formed to act as employer, 
notwithstanding that for some reason, that subsidiary can no longer be pursued. 
 
The regulatory response to the avoidance of liability by the use of corporate groups 
has been described as ‘piecemeal’.88 One possibility is to argue under the common 
law that the corporate veil should be lifted, thus making holding companies liable for 
the actions of subsidiaries. The grounds on which the veil can be lifted are, however, 
uncertain, particularly following comments made by Rogers CJ in Briggs v James 
Hardie & Co Pty Ltd in relation to the traditionally recognised grounds of control and 
dominion.89 Rogers CJ said that 
…in my view the proposition advanced by the plaintiff that the corporate veil may be 
pierced where one company exercises complete dominion and control over another is 
entirely too simplistic. The law pays scant regard to the commercial reality that every 
holding company has the potential and, more often than not, in fact, does, exercise 
complete control over a subsidiary.90
 
Certainly, the fact that a holding-subsidiary company relationship exists, does not 
increase the likelihood that the corporate veil will be lifted in order to render a 
holding company liable for the subsidiary’s breaches. It has been noted that  
 
courts have not displayed any greater willingness to lift the corporate veil merely 
because they are dealing with a corporate group91
                                                 
88 I Ramsay and G Stapledon, ‘Corporate Groups in Australia’, Centre for Corporate Law and 
Securities Regulation, The University of Melbourne, 1998, p vii. 
89 See Smith Stone & Knight Ltd v Birmingham Corporation [1939] 4 All ER 116 at 121 where the 
court asked six questions to determine whether or not the corporate veil should be lifted: 1. Were the 
profits treated as the profits of the parent company?; 2. Were the persons conducting the business 
appointed by the parent company?; 3. Was the parent company the head and brain of the trading 
venture?; 4. Did the parent company govern the adventure, decide what should be done and what 
capital should be embarked on the venture?; 5. Did the parent company make the profits by its skill and 
direction?; 6. Was the parent company in  effectual and constant control?.It seems that these factors 
will be present in the case of most holding/ subsidiary company relationships, and yet will no longer be 
enough to justify a lifting of the corporate veil. 
90 Briggs v James Hardie & Co Pty Ltd (1989) 7 ACLC 841 at 862. 
91 Companies and Securities Advisory Committee, Corporate groups Final Report May 2000, p 18. 
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 Another basis for imposing liability upon a holding company for breaches by a 
subsidiary is to impose duties upon the holding company as a ‘shadow director’. 
‘Director’ is defined in the Corporations Act to include ‘a person who is not validly 
appointed as a director if …the directors of the company or body are accustomed to 
act in accordance with the person’s instructions or wishes.’92 Under this definition, a 
holding company with effective control of a subsidiary might be liable as a ‘shadow 
director’ of the subsidiary.93  
 
The Corporations Act definition of ‘officer’ adopted by the OHSA(Vic), might be 
regarded as including ‘shadow officer’ provisions, in the sense that an officer of a 
corporation is defined similarly to ‘director’ by including ‘a person …in accordance 
with whose instructions or wishes directors of that corporation are accustomed to act…’94
 
Case law95 suggests that officers in holding companies and franchisors will come 
within the definition of an ‘officer’ provided that: 
• the directors of the firm are influenced by the holding company or franchisor;  
• the directors did, in their capacity as directors (that is, fulfilling their roles and 
functions as directors) and as a body act, and were accustomed to act, in 
accordance with the directions or instructions of the officer, without exercising 
their independent discretion;  
                                                 
92 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 9. 
93 Standard Chartered Bank of Australia Ltd v Antico (1995) 18 ACSR 1. 
94 OHSA (Vic), s 5. 
95 Standard Chartered Bank of Australia v Antico (1995) 38 NSWLR 290, especially at 327-328, per 
Hodgson J; and R Schulte, ‘Emerging from the Shadow’, paper presented at Queensland Law Society 
Symposium, 2004, at 24-25. 
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• the officer did exercise their will in the form of giving instructions or 
directions; and 
• there was a causal link, in terms of compliance or obedience, between the 
giving of instructions and directions and the conduct of the directors. 
 
Consistently with the Standard Chartered Bank case96 which found that a holding 
company could be ‘shadow director’, the definition of ‘officer’ under the OHSA(Vic) 
could conceivably include a holding company or a franchisor, and would ensure that 
the holding company or franchisor would face liability under section 144 of that Act, 
whenever a contravention of the Act is attributable to that holding company, as an 
‘officer’, failing to take reasonable care. In the absence of such a definition under 
other state OHS legislation, the problem of corporate group structures being used to 
avoid liability for occupational health and safety contraventions continues as a 
potential obstacle to effective regulation. 
 
Conclusion 
The OHS statutes essentially define ‘employers’ as persons who employ others under 
a contract of employment. These definitions typically make no reference to the way in 
which ‘the employer’ is constituted. This article has examined the application of the 
OHS statutes to the various configurations of ‘the employer’, including partnerships, 
unincorporated associations, joint ventures, networks of firms, and complex 
organisational structures in which the ‘employer’ may be distinct from the asset-
holding and decision-making entity. 
 
                                                 
96 Standard Chartered Bank of Australia Ltd v Antico (1995) 18 ACSR 1. 
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We have explored two dimensions of the Australian OHS statutes which enable 
statutory OHS duties to reach more than one employer or self-employed person within 
a corporate group or network.  
 
First, most of the OHS statutes contain provisions extending the reach of employer’s 
duty beyond the employer’s employees. One legislative technique is to deem 
contractors and their employees to be employees of the principal contractor. Another 
imposes duties on employers and self-employed persons to persons who are not 
employees, so that employers and self-employed persons can be responsible for the 
OHS of firms, and those they engage, lower in the contractual chain. These duties are 
non-delegable, meaning that the principal contractor cannot seek to delegate OHS 
duties to firms lower in the contractual chain. 
 
Second, new Victorian ‘shadow officer’ provisions can be applied to remove 
difficulties and doubt as to the liability of partners in a partnership, officers of 
unincorporated associations, joint venturers, and holding and subsidiary companies 
within corporate groups. While the provisions can be argued simply to confirm that a 
partner who fails to take reasonable care in relation to OHS will be guilty of an 
offence, we demonstrate that there are very real benefits to having ‘shadow officer’ 
provisions which remove uncertainties about the liability of unincorporated 
associations, joint ventures and corporate groups. Perhaps most significantly, the 
Victorian corporate officer provisions have the potential to extend liability to 
individuals and other entities within organisational structures, where those individuals 
and entities make or participate in making decisions that affect the whole or a 
substantial part of the organisation’s business, and are responsible for an OHS offence 
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having been committed, due to their failure to take reasonable care. We suggest that 
similar provisions should be included in all OHS statutes, to overcome at least some 
of the barriers limiting group responsibility for OHS statutory duties. 
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